Civil society has proven outstanding capacities of involvement in the 2004 general elections in Romania and put a remarkable pressure on the political society. This paper aims to discuss the consequences of such involvement for both the political and civil society. We also investigate the conditions that have favoured a successful challenge of the main political actors by the most visible civic advocacy organizations. Further, we inquire how deep can an actor from the civil society go into the lands of the political society. In the end, we weight the achievements and the failures of civil society's active involvement in the game of elections.
Civil society -general considerations
Twenty five years ago civil society began to attract the spotlights of international and regional (from Eastern Europe) specialists and governments. It was more and more clear that civil society has the capacity to promote interests and ideas different from the official ones in totalitarian or autocratic regimes. Eastern Europe was about to experiment how movements generated and organized by civil society organizations (trade unions and churches) are dynamically generating the regime change (Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998; Howard 2003; Tilly 2004 ).
Civil society is a widely used concept not only in political science but also in politicians' discourses and media analyses. During the transition civil society was considered almost a panacea for the consolidation of democracy.
Although the concept of civil society is very used, its meanings are not always clearly underlined. In our paper we consider civil society as the realm of groups different from political parties, made of voluntary individuals having at a certain moment at least one common interest, aiming to influence politics, and obeying their actions to the legal framework. Thus, civil society embraces organizations like trade unions, religious organizations -including churches, political interest groups other than parties, civil rights NGOs. Often, in a very restrictive approach, usually endorsed by international assistance for the development of democracy, civil society is limited especially or even only to the civic advocacy NGOs (Carothers 1996: 65) .
One of the features of civil society is constituted by the space where individuals and institutions representing their interests have the opportunity to develop the basis of different powers: power to influence the outcomes of policy-making process, power to legitimate collective actions in relations with the executive, power to demand a specific direction for the official decisions or the power to threat state's officials and to determine the adoption of certain measures (Dryzek 1996: 481-482) . It is hard to believe that in a democratic regime the state (its official, empowered institutions) can be threatened so easily by civil society institutions. In fact a sounder explanation would be the capacity of bargaining that is shared by state institutions and civil society organizations. This partnership between state and civil society might be seen as a social "checks and balances" between the rulers and the ruled.
Which are the limits of civil society, concerning the component organizations? To answer to this question one must see what kinds of institutions are commonly considered as being part of the civil society. Diamond (1999) adopted an inclusive view. He argued that civil society comprises institutions from areas such as: economic, cultural, informational and educational, interest developmental, issue-oriented and civic. Civil society has specific features that particularize it from other arenas of society.
It is different from the parochial society that Diamond sees as being concerned only with private aims, not public ones. It does not try to share the political power inside the state but to influence it. Further, civil society is seen as being based on plurality and diversity of actions inside the framework of social life. Moreover, it does not monopolize the representation of interests in favour of a single organization, but represents them through a multitude of associations, groups and organizations. At the same time, civil society's component institutions tend to be specialized in representation of certain groups and interests (Almond et al. 2003) .
In this paper we will focus on two groups of civil society organizations: civic advocacy organizations and trade unions. They were the most active parts of civil society during elections. However, their activity had different aims and means to achieve them. Civic advocacy organizations joined a coalition and concentrated on 'cleaning' the party lists from 'Dalmatians' -spotted candidates evaluated by civil society organizations to be unfit for being elected in the Parliament. Trade unions (part of them) aimed to pursue their interests directly in Parliament by promoting union leaders on party lists. In the next parts of the paper we will analyse both strategies in order to unveil the outcomes.
Civil society in Romania: social relevance and future development
Since 1989, the point of regime change and starting of redemocratization process, Romania organized five simultaneous general and presidential elections. Foreign and domestic civil society organizations were involved in monitoring elections since 1990 (see also Carothers 1996: 45) .
During every election process the opinions of election monitoring NGOs about the fairness of the process were highly debated in mass media.
Civil society continuously matured after 1989, although it is far from reaching the level of civic involvement, organization and activities that characterize the western civil societies (Howard 2003: ch. 4 ). The voice of NGOs began to be more powerful and the politicians started to take the NGOs more seriously (Carothers 1996: 68) . There is no current evaluation on the total number of civil society organizations, how many of them are active, how many were registered during a specific period of time and the number of organizations that disappeared in the same period. The pool to offer civic advocacy organizations that might get involved in activities like election monitoring, public awareness or anti-corruption campaigns represents roughly 11-12% of the total number of civil society organizations. Of course, only a small part of this percent is active and finally gets involved in such activities, making it harder to develop powerful monitoring NGOs.
Civil society benefited from large financial, logistic, human and organizational assistance from international donors like USAID, IRI, NDI, NED, PHARE-EU, The German Marshall Fund, UNDP, Soros Foundation or IFES. Without their important assistance the activity of civic advocacy organizations might have been endangered or even inexistent. The effects of international assistance for civic advocacy NGOs were beneficial in terms of training and technical assistance for NGOs, but also in terms of development of new attitudes and opinions inside the society. Politicians and public authorities started "to give more consideration to certain basic rights such as free speech and due process, and to recognize publicly that oppositional politics and human rights advocacy are not the same" (Carothers 1996: 68-69) . Nonetheless, as Thomas Carothers underlines (1996: 69-70 ) the general impact of civic advocacy groups on public awareness and democratic civic consciousness is limited to the urban, educated, and political power-related groups.
The lack of alternative domestic financial assistance makes it very difficult for civic advocacy groups to develop organically and to secure a relative financial independence. Such time, human and financial consuming campaigns as the Coalition for a Clean Parliament in 2004 would have been impossible to exist in their full extension without the international assistance. Even though the partners of the Coalition have different fields of activity (civic awareness, think tank, media monitoring, human rights protection, student organization, journalism), thus increasing the expectation to be able to access different financial resources through grants, it is obvious that the limited number of donors for advocacy campaigns reduces very much the fund-raising field.
Civic advocacy groups are often based on voluntary activity of the mass of members. Instead, in Romania voluntary activity in this sort of organizations is very scarce. Recent analyses (Bădescu 2003; Voicu 2005 ) and opinion polls show that Romanians are not highly participative in voluntary associations. This is not the case that Romanians are an exception compared to other Eastern Europeans. Instead Romanians place above the average membership and active participation in civil society organizations (Howard 2003: 65-66 
Civil society and trade unions
In order to influence state policies, citizens have to be members in "politically relevant groups" being able to influence politics in the direction of group's interests. (Lipset, Trow and Coleman 1956: 15) . Trade unions, as well as other independent organizations in society increase the political socialization of their members. They serve as arenas in which new ideas are generated, networks through which citizens get acquainted with political attitudes, means for training future political leaders, means to get citizens to participate in political activities and bases of opposition to the central authority (Lipset, Trow and Coleman 1956: 80) . Besides collective interests such as wages, working conditions and securing workplace, personal identification with a stance of a group, local tradition, membership in trade unions has other causes as well. Offe and Wiesenthal (1985: 184) The relations of civil society organizations with the state were dominated by trade unions. The pressure that unions have putted on government was higher than that used by other civil society organizations.
Methods like strikes, demonstrations, picketing state institutions were of high impact in media and politicians took seriously the trade unions' pressures during bargaining. Some unions were used by various politicians as a pressure group to determine certain changes in the political status quo.
The miners' marches towards Bucharest in the '90s (the first march took place in June 1990, the last march took place in February 1999) had a deep impact on public opinion attitudes towards trade unions. They were ever since 1990 considered less than a "civic" part of the civil society and more a "mass for political manoeuvres" in political competition. The decline of trade unions in terms of power, membership, capacity to mobilize people, is not as surprising as some authors argue (Ost 1993) . In fact, there are several factors that could explain this decline:
(1) individuals had enough of false voluntary association in trade unions, since before 1989 unions were known as being an extension to the single party, and being a union member would increase the chances to receive a larger apartment, half-priced spa's tickets and even advances on professional hierarchy -all of these benefits vanished after 1989;
(2) the changes in the economy increased uncertainty -legal, institutional, social, welfare -thus, creating a "wild" incipient capitalism, in which trade unions barely tried to adapt themselves rather than focus on collective materialistic and post-materialistic issues; while individuals had to concentrate on personal welfare and securing their owns interests rather than pursuing collective ones, in an unpredictable environment; 
Civil society and elections
Civil society organizations do not resume to merely influencing the decision-making process through specific methods like contacting officials, drafting and promoting laws, organizing strikes, demonstrations and boycotts or signing petitions. Their interaction with the political society is more complex and is based on historical legacies and precedents, international assistance and replication of more or less successful models of activities and strategies of behaviour. Thus, apart from general activities aimed to pursue interests, like the ones mentioned above, we identify three types of interaction between civil society and political society during and the need to organize free elections in the shortest time, which impeded political organizations to develop genuine programs and ideologies (Elster et al. 1998: 134) . and "stirring up stronger feelings: positive and negative" about monitoring (Carothers 1996: 51 
Involvement of civil society in election monitoring

Civil society involvement in the 2004 elections. A general framework
The 2004 
Civil society as involved arbiter
The Coalition for a Clean Parliament (CCP) was probably the most complex politically-oriented initiative ever developed inside the Romanian civil society. It was designed as an anti-corruption awareness campaign, focused on the entire spectre of relevant political elites competing in parliamentary elections. On a first level, the complexity of such an initiative is easy to evaluate in numbers: ten of the most important civic NGOs 2 have continuously worked together for over one year, assuming the role of arbitrating an electoral campaign foreseen as particularly dirty. On a second level, its complexity is given by the mix of actions involved: fund-raising, investigation, negotiation, public information campaign, all in an environment of sharp political pressures.
Briefly, the Coalition for a Clean Parliament aimed to promote the idea of integrity in politics, by the means of a broad public information campaign, "Vote with your eyes wide open!". Mainly, the campaign was a matter of highlighting the candidates considered unfit for public offices because of morality reasons. In such a démarche, civil society was intended to become a public arbiter that should make the rules of political integrity in the competition for the Romanian parliament and then point to those that do not fit such rules. However, this was not an easy job, since the general political context could be easily described in terms of predatory networked elites, generalized state capture, and media ownership control.
The CCP anti-corruption awareness campaign was designed as a sequence of six steps, conceived to offer the program legitimacy, visibility, and a remarkably high blackmail potential.
(1) The first step was to set the rules of the game. (Table 3) . Briefly, this has been the schedule of actions put into practice by the Coalition for a Clean Parliament. Though up to this level the succession of activities has already shown a remarkable and rather unique strategic effort from the civil society, there is a strong need to perceive this effort in the complex system of interactions with the other actors involved in the electoral campaign, namely the political parties/candidates and the media.
Relationship with political parties
We have a self-nominated arbiter, namely a significant part of the civil There was also a second reason for one of the parties (PD) to agree and support CCP's initiative -the cleaning campaign was a perfect opportunity to force several internal opponents to do 'the step back' and, hence, to refresh the party's top leadership.
In this second phase, the National Union PSD+PUR reacted very 
Relationship with the media
Two perspectives should be considered in the media-CCP relationship:
the perspective of the involved media and that of the uninvolved media. By In fact, the CCP largely performed as a political actor with extra-powers due to its civil society origins. Nevertheless, it added more weapons in the electoral battleground that have easily reached the hands of the opposition.
Unintentionally, the CCP transformed itself into a strengthener of campaign issues. Fourth, the Coalition's démarche is not entirely moral with respect to its declared target, the public, since its leaflets presented only the pieces of information that had failed the test of political blackmail before. Though this has been a strategic effect-maximizer decision, its moral character is questionable. Fifth, the CCP did not always succeed in ensuring a perfectly objective and equidistant application of integrity criteria at local level.
Civil society as a watchdog of fair elections
Domestic election monitoring has a rather long-standing tradition in post-communist Romania. And this tradition is largely associated with the names of two non-governmental organizations, Pro Democracy Association (APD) and the League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADO) that emerged in the early 1990s. During their first years of existence, both organizations have had rather similar evolutions, but in the late 1990s the latter one's existence followed a rather descendent curve. Usually, this involution is explained in terms of organizational incapacity of attracting external funding. Such a situation has normally translated into an increasing share of governmental funding which set serious limitations in its activities.
In reverse, Pro Democracy had a stronger capacity of implementing viable external-funded programs and successfully set an extensive network of local county-level 'clubs'.
The 2004 announced its decision to observe the elections.
The first round of elections took place on November 28 th and gave birth to an enormous scandal related to presumed frauds. Pro Democracy accredited 3,565 observers in Bucharest and 32 counties, 10 mainly targeting polling stations placed in rural areas, usually more vulnerable to fraud attempts. 11 Observers' reports have been extremely negative, suggesting that every weak point of the electoral legislation had been frequently speculated.
Multiple voting, electoral tourism, 12 threaten or aggressed observers were only the top of the iceberg. Under these circumstances, the APD report emphasized the large probability for the election results to be biased by the increased level of fraud, estimated at about 3 to 5%. This proved to be the right moment for the Pro Democracy Association to put more pressure on the Government in the issue of electoral legislation.
It was a moment when APD's blackmail potential was at the highest level.
So, the organization publicly announced its decision not to observe the second round of the elections, since the legislative framework was unable to ensure a reasonable level of fairness for the elections. Under these circumstances, considered APD, "the monitoring process is not able to contribute to the fairness of the elections, but only to the legitimization of the winners" (APD Report 2005: 52). During the first two days after the APD announcement, the Government reaction has been extremely feeble.
Vigorous demands for APD to change its decision came from external actors, as the Delegation of the European Commission in Bucharest or the Embassy 10 From a total of 41 counties. 11 About 2,500 observers reached rural areas. 12 People transported with buses in order to vote in multiple polling stations.
of the United States, which did nothing than to put more pressure on the It is remarkable that APD has successfully become a first rank legislative actor, in spite of the sharp resistance from the political society. However, if its means can hardly be considered moral, it is certain that they were appropriate and effective.
It is also clear that APD was significantly more successful in putting pressure on the Government than on the Legislative. There are a few possible explanations for this state of things.
First, the Government was more aware of the external consequences of an APD decision not to observe the elections, mainly in terms of the legitimacy of results. Elections followed an extensive period of critiques addressed to the party in government by the US Embassy, the British Embassy or the Delegation of the European Commission in Bucharest, related to issues like the freedom of expression, media control, etc.
Second, APD's blackmail potential reached its highest quotas when it became the only experienced and legitimate non-partisan EMO. There was no alternative of negotiation from the real civil society for the Government, so all has become a win-lose game, where APD successfully played its cards.
Third, APD's pressure came in a particularly tensed electoral environment. In such an environment, a no-step-back position of the Government would have produced severe damages for the image of the party, with a high potential of being speculated by the opposition. At the level of Parliament, responsibilities are more diffuse and, in consequence, the image damages less significant.
Alternative programs of continuous monitoring
Our The report also indicated a general trend of directing more than half of the advertising expenditures towards the presidential candidates, in an attempt to speculate a supposed leadership effect. 'members' interest' or of 'union's interest'. Still, as the public opinion polls revealed after 1989, people see themselves moreover distant from unions and capitalize very little trust in trade unions as organizations.
Crossing the border: trade unions become political actors
In spite of the collaborative patterns between parties and trade unions, it seems that political parties do not obtain the pursued aims: mass electoral support fails to be collected; the visibility at the level of voters/union members does not increase; the relation with electorate is not better because of the fact that none of the two partners -union or party -is perceived by the electorate as having close relations with it and being concerned with voters' issues; the institutional trust did not increase during the years of electoral cooperation, as percentages in Table 6 suggest. The only benefit seems to be the social stability, which might be sufficient enough for parties On the other side, BNS's electoral involvement was another failure in the attempt to reassess the role of the trade unions in supporting collective rights. The electoral protocol with the Greater Romania Party (PRM) was an initiative with lose-lose outcome. It is also plausible to have consequences on the trade union bargaining and blackmail potential in relation to the government, since the cooperation with an anti-system, marginalized party as PRM was not at all a good label for BNS.
